I appreciate all the Reflections that have provided an interesting set of ideas and perspectives. I will focus my response on three topics raised in the Reflections that I think are the most important issues for stimulating progress in this area of research. First, I will consider questions about how to characterize the different kinds of information or knowledge infants use when segregating objects, as well as how to characterize the relations among these kinds of knowledge. Second, I will discuss the possible relations between the processes underlying object segregation and those involved in a variety of other abilities such as object individuation, object indexing, and figure-ground segregation. Finally, I will consider the roles of visual versus linguistic representations in tasks that require object representation (such as those listed above).
DIFFERENT SOURCES OF INFORMATION USED IN OBJECT SEGREGATION
In the lead article, I suggested that infants use featural, physical, and experiential information to segregate displays. These are the three categories of information that we have explored most extensively, although of course there could be others. For all three categories, there is a component of what is used that is present in the display itself (most easily thought of as the information), as well as a component that the infant must bring to the situation (most easily thought of as knowledge). I would argue that both "information" and "knowledge" must be present for infants to use any of these three sources. That is, infants must be able to detect the information present in the display and must be able to interpret that information with the relevant knowledge in order to use the information to segregate objects in a display. I will typically refer to the information present in the display, although it should be clear that I am also implicitly referring to the knowl-edge infants have that allows them to make use of that information (see Needham, Baillargeon, & Kaufman, 1997 , for further discussion of this point).
How can we clarify the relations, differences, and interactions among these sources of information? First, it seems clear that they vary in their heterogeneity. For example, I suspect that what I have called physical knowledge would actually include basic knowledge about how objects interact (e.g., knowledge about support, solidity, and permanence) as well as the motions of objects (both relative and common motions) and the spatial layout of displays of objects (e.g., whether objects are visibly touching). All of these sources of information are very reliable cues for the composition of a display and may in some cases essentially drown out information available from other sources .
Featural information may be more homogeneous, consisting of object features such as shape and color that define the surfaces of objects. Finally, experiential knowledge could refer to an immediate prior experience with one object as well as a number of experiences with a variety of objects obtained over a long period of time. Quinn and Bhatt (2001, this issue) mention an important issue with respect to how we think about the relations among these different categories, specifically, the time frame involved. In the lead article (and in other work as well, such as the classic study by Granrud, Haake, & Yonas, 1985) , experience with an object received immediately prior to testing influenced infants' perception of the test displays. We have also shown that during a short-term time frame, infants can create and use a more generalized representation of a category of objects that they can use to help them interpret a test display (Needham, Dueker, & Lockhead, 2001 ). Thus, experiential knowledge can influence infants' interpretations of displays in different ways, even within a short-term time frame. There could be a long-term role for these representations as well: Our research has shown that infants can make use of acquired representations of objects for at least 24 h (Needham & Baillargeon, 1998; Needham & Modi, 1999) . One possibility is that these representations serve over the long term as perceptual placeholders (Quinn & Eimas, 1997) for concepts that will later be elaborated and refined as infants add more perceptual and conceptual information. I will return to this point later.
Thus, experiential knowledge has both short-and long-term influences on infants' object segregation. Is the same true for the other two sources of knowledge? Our working hypothesis is that the other sources of knowledge are used only after a longer-term course of knowledge acquisition.
When considering the long-term acquisition of this knowledge, one must examine the number and content of experiences that the infant has collected. Presumably, infants who received many related (yet not identical) experiences over a long period of time would begin to develop a representation that is somewhat general and abstract. If the experiences were of a particular type of object, the resultant representation might be of an object category. If, however, the expe-riences consisted of observations of the ways in which objects move and relate to each other physically, what resulted would be physical knowledge (e.g., objects fall when unsupported). Likewise, if the experiences were observations about the relations between object features and object boundaries, what resulted would be featural knowledge (e.g., similar-looking surfaces belong to the same object).
According to this hypothesis, one important difference between experiential knowledge and other kinds of knowledge is that experiential knowledge could be collected in one moment and used in the next, whereas physical and featural knowledge would take longer (i.e., a greater number and range of experiences) to develop. Infants would presumably need to collect appropriate observations and consolidate them into an abstract representation in order to create and then use these kinds of knowledge. This is obviously a very tentative formulation, but it could generate some testable hypotheses for future research.
Another question of interest concerns the relations among the different kinds of knowledge. My colleagues and I have argued for a hierarchical organization of knowledge, for the following reason. In several studies , we have shown that when both physical information and featural information are available to interpret a display, infants tend to favor the interpretation indicated by the former. In this sense, the physical information is "ranked above" the featural information in infants' framework for segregating objects. In their Reflection, Quinn and Bhatt (2001, this issue) ask where experiential knowledge fits into this hierarchy. This question is a timely one, as many researchers have been exploring adults' use of prior experience in perception and categorization (e.g., Schyns, Goldstone, & Thibaut, 1998) , and it is important to address in the study of infant perception and categorization as well.
The results of our research (see lead article) suggest that infants rely heavily on immediate prior experiences to help them interpret displays of objects that are quite similar to those seen before. However, it may take more and more varied experiences for infants to develop representations of object categories that they can apply to new category members that may look somewhat different from those they have seen before (Needham & Ormsbee, 2001 ). Based on our work, it seems that there is a tendency for both physical and experiential knowledge to be favored in infants' object segregation. Featural knowledge may be different from these other sources in that it is inherently less reliable (and possibly noisier as well) and as a result easier to supress or ignore when other sources are in conflict.
How would infants interpret a display in which the physical and experiential knowledge conflicted? One interesting possibility is that infants might consider such displays anomalous and would seek to investigate them further. For example, consider the following experimental situation involving a conflict between experiential knowledge and physical knowledge about a given display. Infants would first be shown two separate objects, so their experiential knowledge would indicate that the objects were separate entities. Next, the objects would be shown in a new spatial organization, in which one of the previously seen objects seemed to be supported by the other (as in the cylinder-up display used by . If the infants favored their experiential knowledge, they would see the objects as separate; if the infants favored their physical knowledge, they would override this interpretation and see the objects as connected. If both were equally influential, they might consider the display to be anomalous (like an impossible object). Using our method of measuring infants' looking time to the move-apart and move-together test events, we could determine whether the infants perceived the display as one object (if they looked reliably longer at the move-apart than at the move-together event), two objects (if they looked reliably longer at the move-together than at the move-apart event), or anomalous (if they looked equally and very long at both test events). Alternatively, reaching or examining measures could be used to assess infants' expectations about the objects. This may be a study worth pursuing to explore the conditions under which infants favor experiential or physical knowledge in object segregation.
According to the perspective discussed above, the source of the information infants use to interpret a display matters a great deal. However, models such as the Threshold model proposed by Johnson and his colleagues (S. P. Johnson & Aslin, 1996 ; S. P. do not consider the source of the information infants use to be critical. According to Johnson's model, infants essentially tally up what is suggested by different sources of information and then add them all together. In this approach, no one source of information is given precedence over any other. Although this perspective has considerable merit, it may be important for infants to be able to resolve conflicts between different sources of information even when two sources are all they really have to go on. I would argue that infants collect information about reliability or accuracy for each source of information they learn about, and can then compare these values when forming an interpretation of a display.
RELATIONS AMONG OBJECT SEGREGATION AND OTHER PROCESSES INVOLVING OBJECT REPRESENTATION
A second question is whether object segregation, object individuation, and object indexing are essentially the same kinds of processes. Object indexing, as Leslie and Kaldy describe it, and object individuation seem to concern themselves with keeping track of moving objects, often through periods of occlusion. Object indexing, in particular, seems to concern itself with keeping track of objects through periods of motion. Would object indexing be evoked at all (i.e., would there be a reason to index the objects) if the attended objects were not visibly changing their locations in space?
In the studies discussed in the lead article, object motion does not occur in the same way as it does in the typical indexing and individuation studies. The task we used probably does involve some ambiguity of object identity over occlusion, because infants are faced with judging whether the boxes seen during test and familiarization are identical. Although infants do not need to track the object's motion during the period of occlusion, they presumably rely upon the box's features to interpret whether the box is the same as it was in familiarization. Future work is needed to explore the circumstances under which indexing, individuation, and segregation systems are activated. It is plausible that certain kinds of object motion (e.g., repeated occlusions and emergences or motion trajectories that are difficult to anticipate) would be particularly likely to activate the individuation or indexing systems because these rely heavily on spatiotemporal information and tend to be less sensitive to object features early in development (see Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998; Xu & Carey, 1996) . In contrast, objects that are stationary or that move in trajectories that are easy to predict may activate individuation and segregation systems because these are quite sensitive to object features under the right conditions.
Another question for future work is whether object segregation and figure-ground segregation are based on the same underlying processes. One of the main points made by Carey and Williams is that the findings from the lead article may be based on a weaker form of recognition than those from some of Carey's prior work (e.g., Xu, Carey, & Welch, 1999) . Specifically, they raise the possibility that the use of memories in object segregation may be based on the same low-level memory process that Mary Peterson and her colleagues have shown can influence adults' (even amnesiac adults') figure-ground perception.
Weaker and stronger forms of recognition have been evoked by cognitive psychologists under many circumstances (e.g., Mandler, 1980; Tulving, 1985) . The distinction has been investigated directly in adults by, for example, asking them whether they really remember something's happening or if they just know that it happened (e.g., Tulving, 1985) . One might speculate that infants also experience weaker and stronger forms of recognition but investigating this distinction may well be a nearly intractable problem given that infants cannot report the contents of their consciousness.
One concern about the argument made by Carey and Williams is that it assumes that the damaged adult brain is a good model for the developing infant brain. This assumption is not likely to be valid. There is now considerable evidence suggesting that extensive brain development occurs postnatally and that areas of brain that are dedicated to particular functions in adulthood may not yet be so dedicated in early infancy (M. H. . Therefore, an adult brain in which one specialized area has been damaged for some reason does not necessarily provide a good model for a developing brain.
Second, Peterson's results (e.g., Peterson, de Gelder, Rapcsak, Gerhardstein, & Bachoud-Levi, 2000) are very interesting, and have important implications for how the adult brain processes shape. But it is not clear to me that figure-ground organization and object segregation are as similar as Carey and Williams claim they are. Why?
One reason is that the experimental tasks used to elicit responses from the studies' participants are quite different. Peterson's stimuli are two-dimensional blackand-white shapes, whereas ours are real three-dimensional objects of various col-ors. The task for the observer in Peterson's studies is to determine whether the white or the black part of the display is the figure, presumably based on information about shape at the boundary between the black and the white portions. However, in object segregation studies (and object unity studies), the figure is typically made clear by placing it several inches in front of the background. What infants must do is to determine how many objects make up the figure, presumably based on the features or other information presented by the object away from the boundary itself. In Peterson's tasks, the boundary is likely to be the key piece of information, whereas in object segregation tasks, the boundary itself (other than its presence or absence) may have little interesting information to contribute to the interpretation of the display's composition. These two kinds of tasks (and the processes that underlie successful performance in them) seem different, and I know of no empirical findings that connect the two phenomena.
ROLES OF VISUAL VERSUS LINGUISTIC REPRESENTATIONS
Finally, it is of interest to ask the extent to which visual (as opposed to linguistic) representations are responsible for infants' success in object representation tasks. At issue here is whether visually based representations could be sufficient for infants to succeed in tasks such as object individuation and object segregation or whether linguistically based representations are critical to infants' success. Carey and her colleagues have argued for the latter position, but I would argue for the former.
In their Reflection, Carey and Williams (2001, this issue ) surprisingly referred to the kind representations that 12-month-old infants have and use in their studies as "full" kind representations. Surely the authors do not wish to claim that children develop full or complete knowledge of categories like "duck" and "car" by 1 year of age. It seems unlikely that even 12-month-old infants have full kind concepts for anything but perhaps a few object categories with which they have had extensive experience.
It seems more sensible to assume that the process of knowledge acquisition about categories is a gradual one that begins with infants' first exposure to an object from a given category and continues throughout life. Carey and her colleagues may wish to argue that acquisition of knowledge about a given object category begins when infants learn the word for that category, but we consider this position extremely unlikely. Why? One reason has to do with a large body of work by Quinn and others (see Quinn, 1998 , for a review; also see Quinn & Johnson, 2000; Younger & Fearing, 2000) , showing that even very young infants can create perceptually based categories of objects within a single brief experimental session. One must presume that these perceptual categories are the initial representations to which additional information about the category is added as it is acquired, resulting in richer conceptual categories. If this does not happen, why do infants bother forming these perceptual categories? What function do they serve? Why are infants so good at forming these categories in the lab if they do not do so during their everyday experiences?
Even though we do not know the answers to these questions, it seems better to endorse a model of cognitive development in which infants' experiences during the first year are helping them make sense of the world on a daily basis, rather than a model that has no important role for these experiences until infants begin to learn the words for things. Furthermore, we have gathered extensive evidence that infants have and use many sources of knowledge about objects to segregate object displays well before they understand or produce the words for the objects in these displays. For example, one set of studies shows that a brief prior exposure to a collection of boxes (such as those described in the lead paper) facilitated 4.5-month-old infants' segregation of the test display. Another series of studies explored how infants use knowledge of object categories they have already acquired before entering the lab (Needham & Ormsbee, 2001) . Results from this work also indicate that infants interpret displays differently when they have this prior category knowledge than when they do not.
Carey and Williams state that infants' first kind concept is a "Spelke object" and then the rest of these kind concepts do not appear until about 12 months of age. I agree that infants probably know Spelke objects quite early, but why the long lag in infants' acquisition of knowledge about objects? For example, it seems possible for object categories like "box," "cylinder," or "sphere" to serve as rudimentary object kinds for young infants. There are things to learn about boxes (e.g., they serve as containers for food and other objects, they sometimes open up on one end, they tend to be cubic or rectangular solids), about cylinders (e.g., they can serve as containers for food or other objects, they can roll if placed in a certain orientation, flexible cylinders such as hoses can connect two objects), and about spheres (e.g., they roll, they sometimes bounce, people throw them). Carey (1996, 2000) state that sortal concepts differ from properties in that the former are count nouns: You can count how many apples but not how many red. It seems clear that the categories of box, cylinder, or sphere are based on properties but are count nouns: unlike properties such as "red" or "striped," you can count the boxes, cylinders, or spheres in a room.
Also, it seems clear that infants get much more early exposure to items that would fit into categories like "box," "cylinder," or "sphere" than to items that would fit into categories such as "rubber ducky" or "toy car." Just walking down the aisles at a typical grocery store one time, you can see hundreds of instances of boxes (cereal, crackers, cookies), of cylinders (cans of coffee and soda, canned fruits and vegetables, containers of oatmeal), and of spheres (apples, oranges, grapefruit). In contrast, how many different instances of rubber ducky does the typical baby encounter? It seems reasonable to propose that categories for which the observer has seen many, many exemplars are more likely to be rich and elaborated, compared to categories for which the observer has seen only a few exemplars (Medin & Smith, 1984; Nosofsky, 1988; Smith & Medin, 1981) . Because we know of infants' natural tendencies to impose order on the things they perceive in the world, why would they fail to do so in this circumstance?
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our research can be led in fascinating and productive directions if we study the interdependencies among the areas of object recognition, categorization, and object perception. Taken together, the Reflections demonstrate a healthy diversity in both (a) the levels of analysis taken by different investigators and (b) the disciplines drawn upon for inspiration of new research questions. There is room for many different approaches to our questions, and no one approach is necessarily superior to all others. Emerging from this collection of papers is consensus that much remains to be discovered by using looking time measures, carefully designed comparison conditions, and additional kinds of measures such as reaching or object examining actions. By testing our hypotheses in a variety of ways and by following Lloyd Morgan's admonition to exercise restraint in interpreting our data, we will be better able to judge whether our findings mean what we think they do. By synthesizing the methods and findings from the range of approaches represented in this issue, we should have a better chance of making real progress in understanding the development of infants' percepts, concepts, and representations.
